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OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 In 2009, Appellant Ryan Hart (“Appellant” or “Hart”)1 
brought suit against Appellee Electronic Arts, Inc. 
(“Appellee” or “EA”) for allegedly violating his right of 
publicity as recognized under New Jersey law.  Specifically, 
Appellant‟s claims stemmed from Appellee‟s alleged use of 
his likeness and biographical information in its NCAA 
Football series of videogames.  The District Court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Appellee on the ground that its 
                                              
1
 Appellant‟s action purports to be a class action on behalf of 
similarly situated individuals.  Because the putative class 
members all face the same issues with regard to the First 
Amendment we will focus our attention and analysis on 
Appellant in particular. 
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use of Appellant‟s likeness was protected by the First 
Amendment.  For the reasons set forth below, we will reverse 
the grant of summary judgment and remand the case back to 
the District Court for further proceedings. 
I.     Facts 
 Hart was a quarterback, player number 13, with the 
Rutgers University NCAA Men‟s Division I Football team 
for the 2002 through 2005 seasons.  As a condition of 
participating in college-level sports, Hart was required to 
adhere to the National Collegiate Athletic Association‟s 
(“NCAA”) amateurism rules as set out in Article 12 of the 
NCAA bylaws.  See, e.g., NCAA, 2011-12 NCAA Division I 
Manual § 12.01.1 (2011) (“Only an amateur student-athlete is 
eligible for inter-collegiate athletics participation in a 
particular sport.”).  In relevant part, these rules state that a 
collegiate athlete loses his or her “amateur” status if (1) the 
athlete “[u]ses his or her athletics skill (directly or indirectly) 
for pay in any form in that sport,” id. § 12.1.2, or (2) the 
athlete “[a]ccepts any remuneration or permits the use of his 
or her name or picture to advertise, recommend or promote 
directly the sale or use of a commercial product or service of 
any kind,” id. § 12.5.2.1.2  In comporting with these bylaws, 
                                              
2
 The NCAA Manual also states that where a collegiate 
athlete‟s  
name or picture appears on commercial 
items . . . or is used to promote a commercial 
product sold by an individual or agency without 
the student-athlete‟s knowledge or permission, 
the student athlete (or the institution acting on 
behalf of the student-athlete) is required to take 
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Hart purportedly refrained from seizing on various 
commercial opportunities.
3
  On the field, Hart excelled.  At 
6‟2”, weighing 197 pounds, and typically wearing a visor and 
armband on his left wrist, Hart amassed an impressive list of 
achievements as the Scarlet Knights‟ starting quarterback.  As 
of this writing, Hart still holds the Scarlet Knights‟ records 
for career attempts, completions, and interceptions.
4
  Hart‟s 
skill brought success to the team and during his senior year 
the Knights were invited to the Insight Bowl, their first Bowl 
game since 1978. 
 Hart‟s participation in college football also ensured his 
inclusion in EA‟s successful NCAA Football videogame 
franchise.  EA, founded in 1982, is “one of the world‟s 
leading interactive entertainment software companies,” and 
“develops, publishes, and distributes interactive software 
worldwide” for consoles, cell phones, and PCs.  (App. at 529-
30.)  EA‟s catalogue includes NCAA Football, the videogame 
series at issue in the instant case.  The first edition of the 
                                                                                                     
steps to stop such an activity in order to retain 
his or her eligibility for intercollegiate athletics. 
NCAA, 2011-12 NCAA Division I Manual § 12.5.2.2 (2011). 
3
 NCAA bylaws limit college athletes like Hart to receiving 
only non-athletic financial aid, either through academic 
scholarships or need-based aid, or athletic scholarships, which 
cover only tuition and various school-related expenses.  See 
NCAA, 2011-12 NCAA Division I Manual § 15 (2011). 
4
 Until his recent displacement by Mike Teel, Hart also held 
the team records for career yards and touchdowns. 
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game was released in 1993 as Bill Walsh College Football.  
EA subsequently changed the name first to College Football 
USA (in 1995), and then to the current NCAA Football (in 
1997).  New editions in the series are released annually, and 
“allow[] users to experience the excitement and challenge of 
college football” by interacting with “over 100 virtual teams 
and thousands of virtual players.”  (Id. at 530.) 
 A typical play session allows users the choice of two 
teams.  “Once a user chooses two college teams to compete 
against each other, the video game assigns a stadium for the 
match-up and populates it with players, coaches, referees, 
mascots, cheerleaders and fans.”5  (Id.)  In addition to this 
“basic single-game format,” EA has introduced a number of 
additional game modes that allow for “multi-game” play.  (Id. 
at 530-31.)  Thus, with the release of NCAA Football 98, EA 
introduced the “Dynasty Mode,” which allows users to 
“control[] a college program for up to thirty seasons,” 
including “year-round responsibilities of a college coach such 
as recruiting virtual high school players out of a random-
generated pool of athletes.”  (Id. at 531.)  Later, in NCAA 
Football 2006, EA introduced the “Race for the Heisman” 
(later renamed “Campus Legend”), which allows users to 
“control a single [user-made] virtual player from high school 
through his collegiate career, making his or her own choices 
                                              
5
 Appellee licenses, from the Collegiate Licensing Company 
(the NCAA‟s licensing agent), “the right to use member 
school names, team names, uniforms, logos, stadium fight 
songs, and other game elements.”  (App. at 532.)  Unlike 
certain of its other videogame franchises, EA does not license 
the likeness and identity rights for intercollegiate players. 
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regarding practices, academics and social activities.”  (Id. at 
531-32.) 
 In no small part, the NCAA Football franchise‟s 
success owes to its focus on realism and detail — from 
realistic sounds, to game mechanics, to team mascots.
6
  This 
focus on realism also ensures that the “over 100 virtual 
teams” in the game are populated by digital avatars that 
resemble their real-life counterparts and share their vital and 
biographical information.  Thus, for example, in NCAA 
Football 2006, Rutgers‟ quarterback, player number 13, is 
6‟2” tall, weighs 197 pounds and resembles Hart.  Moreover, 
while users can change the digital avatar‟s appearance and 
most of the vital statistics (height, weight, throwing distance, 
etc.), certain details remain immutable: the player‟s home 
state, home town, team, and class year.   
 Appellant filed suit against EA in state court for, 
among other things, violation of his right of publicity.  
Appellant‟s first amended complaint, filed in October 2009, 
alleged that Appellee violated his right of publicity by 
appropriating his likeness for use in the NCAA Football series 
of videogames.  Appellee subsequently removed the action to 
federal court, and the District Court subsequently dismissed 
                                              
6
 For example, an article on the EA Sports blog explained that 
“[e]ach year, NCAA Football playbook designer Anthony 
White strives to make each team‟s playbook accurately 
represent their system and play style. . . . [E]ach year, 
Anthony adds in actual plays run by teams that can only be 
found in specific playbooks.”  (App. at 663.) 
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all but one of the claims.
7
  Thereafter, on October 12, 2010, 
Appellant filed his second amended complaint, again alleging 
a claim pursuant to the right of publicity based on Appellee‟s 
purported misappropriation of Appellant‟s identity and 
likeness to enhance the commercial value of NCAA Football.  
Specifically, Appellant alleges that (1) Appellee replicated his 
likeness in NCAA Football 2004, 2005, and 2006 (complete 
with biographical and career statistics)
8
 and that (2) Appellee 
used Appellant‟s image “in the promotion for [NCAA 
Football] wherein [Appellant] was throwing a pass with 
actual footage from Rutgers University‟s Bowl Game against 
Arizona State University.”9  (App. at 370.) 
 On November 12, 2010, Appellee filed a motion to 
dismiss the claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
                                              
7
 The District Court had diversity jurisdiction over the case 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). 
8
 Appellant alleges that the physical attributes exhibited by 
the virtual avatar in NCAA Football are his own (i.e., he 
attended high school in Florida, measures 6‟2” tall, weighs 
197 pounds, wears number 13, and has the same left wrist 
band and helmet visor) and that the avatar‟s speed, agility, 
and passer rating reflected actual footage of Appellant during 
his tenure at Rutgers.  (App. at 369-71.) 
9
 It is unclear from the complaint what exactly this allegation 
covers.  However, Appellee concedes that “[a] photograph of 
[Appellant] is included in a photo montage of actual players 
within NCAA Football 09 which is visible only when the 
game is played on certain game platforms by those users who 
select Rutgers as their team.”  (App. at 475.) 
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12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, summary judgment pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c).  While conceding, for 
purposes of the motion only, that it had violated Appellant‟s 
right of publicity, Appellee argued that it was entitled to 
dismissal or summary judgment on First Amendment 
grounds.  Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 766 
(D.N.J. 2011).  The motion was accompanied by a Statement 
of Undisputed Fact and various supporting materials, 
including declarations.  Appellant opposed the motion, 
arguing that “discovery [was] still in it‟s [sic] infancy.”  
(App. at 9.)  The court below rejected this argument, noting 
that Appellant had “fail[ed] to identify how discovery would 
assist the Court in deciding this speech-based tort case.”  
Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 764.  The District Court then 
construed the motion as one for summary judgment, citing its 
intent to “rely on the affidavits and exhibits submitted by the 
parties,” id., and ruled in favor of Appellee, holding that 
NCAA Football was entitled to protection under the First 
Amendment.  Appellant timely appealed, arguing that the 
District Court erred in granting summary judgment 
prematurely and, in the alternative, erred in holding that 
NCAA Football was shielded from right of publicity claims 
by the First Amendment.  The matter is now before us for 
review. 
II.     Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District Court‟s order 
granting summary judgment is plenary.  Azur v. Chase Bank, 
USA, Nat’l Ass’n, 601 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010).  “To that 
end, we are „required to apply the same test the district court 
should have utilized initially.‟”  Chambers ex rel. Chambers 
v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 181 (3d Cir. 
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2009) (quoting Oritani Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fidelity & 
Deposit Co. of Md., 989 F.2d 635, 637 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
 Summary judgment is appropriate “where the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, 
and affidavits show there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.”  Azur, 601 F.3d at 216 (quoting Nicini v. Morra, 212 
F.3d 798, 805-06 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citing Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(c))).
10
  To be material, a fact must have the potential to 
alter the outcome of the case.  See Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 
455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006).  “Once the moving party 
points to evidence demonstrating no issue of material fact 
exists, the non-moving party has the duty to set forth specific 
facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists and 
that a reasonable factfinder could rule in its favor.”  Azur, 601 
F.3d at 216.  In determining whether summary judgment is 
warranted “[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, 
and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”  
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); 
see also Chambers ex rel. Chambers, 587 F.3d at 181.  
“Further, [w]e may affirm the District Court on any grounds 
supported by the record.”  Kossler v. Cristani, 564 F.3d 181, 
                                              
10
  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 was revised in 2010.  The standard 
previously set forth in subsection (c) is now codified as 
subsection (a).  The language of this subsection is unchanged, 
except for “one word — genuine „issue‟ bec[ame] genuine 
„dispute.‟”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee‟s note, 
2010 amend. 
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186 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 In connection with Appellant‟s request for additional 
discovery, we review “[w]hether a district court prematurely 
grant[ed] summary judgment . . . for abuse of discretion.”  
Radich v. Goode, 886 F.2d 1391, 1393 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing 
Dowling v. City of Phila., 855 F.2d 136 (3d Cir. 1988)).  “To 
demonstrate an abuse of discretion, [an appellant] must show 
that the District Court‟s decision was arbitrary, fanciful or 
clearly unreasonable.”  Moyer v. United Dominion Indus., 
Inc., 473 F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Hanover Potato Prods., Inc. v. 
Shalala, 989 F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1993) (“An abuse of 
discretion arises when „the district court‟s decision rests upon 
a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of 
law or an improper application of law to fact.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
III.     Discussion 
 We begin our analysis by noting the self-evident: 
video games are protected as expressive speech under the 
First Amendment.  Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 
2729, 2733 (2011).  As the Supreme Court has noted, “video 
games communicate ideas — and even social messages — 
through many familiar literary devices (such as characters, 
dialogue, plot, and music) and through features distinctive to 
the medium (such as the player‟s interaction with the virtual 
world).”  Id.  As a result, games enjoy the full force of First 
Amendment protections.  As with other types of expressive 
conduct, the protection afforded to games can be limited in 
situations where the right of free expression necessarily 
conflicts with other protected rights. 
14 
 
 The instant case presents one such situation.  Here, 
Appellee concedes, for purposes of the motion and appeal, 
that it violated Appellant‟s right of publicity; in essence, 
misappropriating his identity for commercial exploitation.  
(Appellant‟s Br. at 8, 34; Tr. at 50:12-:16.)  However, 
Appellee contends that the First Amendment shields it from 
liability for this violation because NCAA Football is a 
protected work.  To resolve the tension between the First 
Amendment and the right of publicity, we must balance the 
interests underlying the right to free expression against the 
interests in protecting the right of publicity.  See Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 574-75 (1977).
11
   
 Courts have taken varying approaches in attempting to 
strike a balance between the competing interests in right of 
publicity cases, some more appealing than others.  In our 
discussion below, we first consider the nature of the interests 
we must balance and then analyze the different approaches 
courts have taken to resolving the tension between the First 
Amendment and the right of publicity. 
A.     The Relevant Interests at Issue 
 Before engaging with the different analytical schemes, 
we first examine the relevant interests underlying the rights of 
free expression and publicity. 
                                              
11
 While it is true that the right of publicity is a creature of 
state law and precedent, its intersection with the First 
Amendment presents a federal issue, and, thus, permits us to 
engage in the sort of balancing inquiry at issue here.  See, 
e.g., Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 566-68. 
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1.     Freedom of Expression 
 Freedom of expression is paramount in a democratic 
society, for “[i]t is the function of speech to free men from the 
bondage of irrational fears.”  Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 
357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).  As Justice Louis 
Brandeis wrote nearly a century ago: 
Those who won our independence believed that 
the final end of the state was to make men free 
to develop their faculties . . . . They valued 
liberty both as an end and as a means.  They 
believed liberty to [be] the secret of happiness 
and courage to be the secret of liberty.  They 
believed that freedom to think as you will and 
to speak as you think are means indispensable 
to the discovery and spread of political truth; 
that without free speech and assembly 
discussion would be futile; that with them, 
discussion affords ordinarily adequate 
protection against the dissemination of noxious 
doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is 
an inert people; that public discussion is a 
political duty; and that this should be a 
fundamental principle of the American 
government. 
Id. at 375.   
 In keeping with Justice Brandeis‟ eloquent analysis, 
the great legal minds of generations past and present have 
recognized that free speech benefits both the individual and 
society.  The Supreme Court in Procunier v. Martinez noted 
that the protection of free speech serves the needs “of the 
16 
 
human spirit — a spirit that demands self-expression,” adding 
that “[s]uch expression is an integral part of the development 
of ideas and a sense of identity.”  416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974), 
overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 
U.S. 401 (1989).  Suppressing such expression, therefore, is 
tantamount to rejecting “the basic human desire for 
recognition and [would] affront the individual‟s worth and 
dignity.”  Id.  Indeed, First Amendment protections have been 
held applicable to not only political speech, but to 
“entertainment [including, but certainly not limited to,] 
motion pictures, programs broadcast by radio and television, 
and live entertainment, such as musical and dramatic works.”  
Tacynec v. City of Phila., 687 F.2d 793, 796 (3d Cir. 1982).  
Thus, “[t]he breadth of this protection evinces recognition 
that freedom of expression is not only essential to check 
tyranny and foster self-government but also intrinsic to 
individual liberty and dignity and instrumental in society‟s 
search for truth.”  Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss 
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 787 (1985) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
 The interest in safeguarding the integrity of these 
protections therefore weighs heavily in any balancing inquiry.  
Still, instances can and do arise where First Amendment 
protections yield in the face of competing interests.  See, e.g., 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-20 (2003) (discussing 
the interplay between copyright law and First Amendment 
protections); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 757-61 
(determining that a state may allow recovery of damages in 
certain defamation cases after balancing “the State‟s interest 
in compensating private individuals for injury to their 
reputation against the First Amendment interest in protecting 
this type of expression”).  Ultimately, we must determine 
17 
 
whether the interest in safeguarding the right of publicity 
overpowers the interest in safeguarding free expression. 
2.     The Right of Publicity
12
 
 The right of publicity grew out of the right to privacy 
torts, specifically, from the tort of “invasion of privacy by 
appropriation.”  J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF 
PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY §1:23 (2d ed. 2012).  Thus, when 
New Jersey first recognized the concept in 1907, its analysis 
looked to the “so-called right of privacy” and the limits on 
that concept.  Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg. Co., 67 A. 392, 
394 (N.J. Ch. 1907) (enjoining a company from using the 
name or likeness of Thomas Edison to promote its products).  
Additionally, we note that, even at this early stage the New 
Jersey court recognized that an individual enjoyed a property 
interest in his or her identity.  Id. (“[I]t is difficult to 
understand why the peculiar cast of one‟s features is 
not . . . one‟s property, and why its pecuniary value, if it has 
one, does not belong to its owner, rather than to the person 
seeking to make an unauthorized use of it.”). 
 However, this early conceptualization had limitations, 
particularly when it came to protecting the property interests 
of celebrities and people already in the public eye.  See id. 
(“It is certain that a man in public life may not claim the same 
                                              
12
 As we have noted, Appellee concedes that NCAA Football 
infringes on the right of publicity as recognized in New 
Jersey.  Our inquiry, therefore, does not concern the elements 
of the tort or whether Appellee‟s actions satisfy this standard.  
Rather, we are concerned only with whether the right to 
freedom of expression overpowers the right of publicity. 
18 
 
immunity from publicity that a private citizen may.”); see 
also MCCARTHY, supra, at § 1:25.  Faced with this limitation 
on the legal doctrine, courts began to recognize a “right of 
publicity,” which protected publicly known persons from the 
misappropriation of their identities.  The first case to describe 
this protection as a “right of publicity” was Haelan Labs., Inc. 
v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953) 
(concerning baseball cards in gum packages).  There, the 
Second Circuit held that “in addition to and independent of 
that right of privacy . . . , a man has a right in the publicity 
value of his photograph . . . . This right might be called a 
„right of publicity.‟”  Id. at 868.  New Jersey courts, which 
had long recognized a “right of privacy [and] a right of 
property,” were not far behind in voicing their support for this 
concept.  Ettore v. Philco Television Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 
481, 491 (3d Cir. 1956). 
 In the seminal case of Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., 
Inc., the Superior Court of New Jersey noted that 
[p]erhaps the basic and underlying theory is that 
a person has the right to enjoy the fruits of his 
own industry free from unjustified interference.  
It is unfair that one should be permitted to 
commercialize or exploit or capitalize upon 
another‟s name, reputation or accomplishments 
merely because the owner‟s accomplishments 
have been highly publicized. 
232 A.2d 458, 462 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967) (citations 
omitted) (finding an infringement of property rights where a 
golfer‟s name was used in connection with a golf game); see 
also Canessa v. J.I. Kislak, Inc., 235 A.2d 62, 76 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Law Div. 1967) (“[T]he reality of a case such as we have 
19 
 
here is, in the court‟s opinion, simply this: plaintiffs‟ names 
and likenesses belong to them.  As such they are property.  
They are things of value.”). 
 The current incarnation of the right of publicity in New 
Jersey is that set forth in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS (1977).  See, e.g., Bisbee v. John C. Conover Agency, 
Inc., 452 A.2d 689, 690-91 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982) 
(looking to the Restatement (Second) of Torts for the “four 
areas of invasion of privacy,” including “appropriation of the 
other‟s name or likeness”); see also G.D. v. Kenny, 15 A.3d 
300, 311 (N.J. 2011).  According to the Restatement, “[o]ne 
who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or 
likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for 
invasion of privacy.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
652C.  The comments also make clear that “the right created 
by [the rule in §652C] is in the nature of a property right.”  Id. 
§ 652C cmt a.
13
 
 New Jersey law therefore recognizes that “[t]he right 
to exploit the value of [an individual‟s] notoriety or fame 
                                              
13
 In 1995 the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION set forth the elements of a free-standing right 
of publicity claim, unconnected to the right of privacy torts.  
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46-49 
(1995).  While we discuss this version of the tort further 
below, we decline to address it here because New Jersey has 
yet to adopt the Restatement (Third)‟s version of the tort and 
the accompanying comments.  Accord Castro v. NYT 
Television, 851 A.2d 88, 96-97 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2004) (citing to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C 
(1977) in discussing a right of publicity claim). 
20 
 
belongs to the individual with whom it is associated,” for an 
individual‟s “name, likeness, and endorsement carry value 
and an unauthorized use harms the person both by diluting the 
value of the name and depriving that individual of 
compensation.”  McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 919, 923 
(3d Cir. 1994).  As such, the goal of maintaining a right of 
publicity is to protect the property interest that an individual 
gains and enjoys in his identity through his labor and effort.  
Additionally, as with protections for intellectual property, the 
right of publicity is designed to encourage further 
development of this property interest.  Accord Zacchini, 433 
U.S. at 573 (“[T]he State‟s interest in permitting a „right of 
publicity‟ . . . is closely analogous to the goals of patent and 
copyright law, focusing on the right of the individual to reap 
the reward of his endeavors . . . .”). 
 Since neither the New Jersey courts nor our own 
circuit have set out a definitive methodology for balancing the 
tension between the First Amendment and the right of 
publicity, we are presented with a case of first impression.  
We must therefore consult the approaches of other courts in 
the first instance. 
B.     How Courts Balance the Interests 
 We begin our inquiry by looking at Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., the only Supreme Court 
case addressing the First Amendment in a right of publicity 
context.  In this case, the Court called for a balancing test to 
weigh the interest underlying the First Amendment against 
those underpinning the right of publicity.  433 U.S. at 574-75.  
This decision sets the stage for our analysis of three 
systematized analytical frameworks that have emerged as 
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courts struggle with finding a standardized way for 
performing this balancing inquiry. 
1.     Zacchini and the Need for Balance 
 In Zacchini, an Ohio television news program recorded 
and subsequently broadcast Mr. Hugo Zacchini‟s entire 
“human cannonball” act from a local fair.  The daredevil 
brought suit alleging a violation of his right of publicity as 
recognized by Ohio law.  Id. at 563-66.  The Ohio courts held 
that Zacchini‟s claim was barred on First Amendment 
grounds, and the case then came before the Supreme Court. 
 In setting out the interests at issue in the case, the 
Supreme Court noted (as we did above) that “the State‟s 
interest in permitting a „right of publicity‟ is in protecting the 
proprietary interest of the individual in his act in part to 
encourage such entertainment.”  Id. at 573.  This aspect of the 
right, the Court noted, was “analogous to the goals of patent 
and copyright law,” given that they too serve to protect the 
individual‟s ability to “reap the reward of his endeavors.”  Id.  
In Zacchini, the performance was the “product of [Zacchini‟s] 
own talents and energy, the end result of much time, effort 
and expense.”  Id. at 575.  Thus much of its economic value 
lay “in the right of exclusive control over the publicity given 
to his performance.”  Id.  Indeed, while the Court noted that 
“[a]n entertainer such as petitioner usually has no objection to 
the widespread publication of his act as long as [he] gets the 
commercial benefit of such publication,” id. at 573, the claim 
at issue in the Zacchini concerned “the strongest case for a 
„right of publicity,‟” because it did not involve the 
“appropriation of an entertainer‟s reputation to enhance the 
attractiveness of a commercial product,” but instead involved 
“the appropriation of the very activity by which the 
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entertainer acquired his reputation in the first place,” id. at 
576. 
 Ultimately, the Court ruled in favor of the human 
cannonball, and held that 
[w]herever the line in particular situations is to 
be drawn between media reports that are 
protected and those that are not, we are quite 
sure that the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
do not immunize the media when they 
broadcast a performer‟s entire act without his 
consent.  The Constitution no more prevents a 
State from requiring respondent to compensate 
petitioner for broadcasting his act on television 
than it would privilege respondent to film and 
broadcast a copyrighted dramatic work without 
liability to the copyright owner. 
Id. at 574-75.  Thus, while the Court did not itself engage in 
an explicit balancing inquiry, it did suggest that the respective 
interests in a case should be balanced against each other. 
 In the wake of Zacchini, courts began applying a 
balancing inquiry to resolve cases where a right of publicity 
claim collided with First Amendment protections.  While 
early cases approached the analysis from an ad hoc 
perspective, see, e.g., Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 
603 P.2d 454 (Cal. 1979) (en banc), courts eventually began 
developing standardized balancing frameworks.  
Consequently, we now turn our attention to more 
standardized balancing tests to see whether any of them offer 
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a particularly compelling methodology for resolving the case 
at hand and similar disputes.
14
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 We reject as inapplicable in this case the suggestion that 
those who play organized sports are not significantly 
damaged by appropriation of their likeness because “players 
are rewarded, and handsomely, too, for their participation in 
games and can earn additional large sums from endorsement 
and sponsorship arrangements.”  C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., 
Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 
F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007) (discussing Major League 
Baseball players); see also, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major 
League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 974 (10th Cir. 
1996) (“[T]he additional inducement for achievement 
produced by publicity rights are often inconsequential 
because most celebrities with valuable commercial identities 
are already handsomely compensated.”).  If anything, the 
policy considerations in this case weigh in favor of Appellant.  
As we have already noted, intercollegiate athletes are 
forbidden from capitalizing on their fame while in school.  
Moreover, the NCAA most recently estimated that “[l]ess 
than one in 100, or 1.6 percent, of NCAA senior football 
players will get drafted by a National Football League (NFL) 
team.”  NCAA, Estimated Probability of Competing in 
Athletics Beyond the High School Interscholastic Level, 
available at http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ 
ncaa/pdfs/2012/estimated+probability+of+competing+in+athl
etics+beyond+the+high+school+interscholastic+level.  
Despite all of his achievements, it should be noted that Ryan 
Hart was among the roughly ninety-nine percent who were 
not drafted after graduation. 
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2.     The Modern Balancing Tests 
 Following Zacchini, courts began developing more 
systematized balancing tests for resolving conflicts between 
the right of publicity and the First Amendment.  Of these, 
three tests are of particular note: the commercial-interest-
based Predominant Use Test, the trademark-based Rogers 
Test, and the copyright-based Transformative Use Test.  The 
Rogers and Transformative Use tests are the most well-
established, while the Predominant Use Test is addressed 
below only because Appellant argues in favor of its adoption.  
We consider each test in turn, looking at its origins, scope of 
application, and possible limitations.  For the reasons 
discussed below, we adopt the Transformative Use Test as 
being the most appropriate balancing test to be applied here. 
a.     Predominant Use Test 
 Appellant urges us to adopt the Predominant Use Test, 
which first appeared in Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 
363 (Mo. 2003) (en banc), a case that considered a hockey 
player‟s right of publicity claim against a comic book 
publishing company.  In TCI, Anthony “Tony” Twist, a 
hockey player, brought suit against a number of individuals 
and entities involved in producing and publishing the Spawn 
comic book series after the introduction of a villainous 
character named Anthony “Tony Twist” Twistelli. 
 In balancing Twist‟s property interests in his own 
name and identity against the First Amendment interests of 
the comic book creators, the TCI court rejected both the 
Transformative Use and Rogers tests, noting that they gave 
“too little consideration to the fact that many uses of a 
person‟s name and identity have both expressive and 
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commercial components.”  Id. at 374.  The Supreme Court of 
Missouri considered both tests to be too rigid, noting that they 
operated “to preclude a cause of action whenever the use of 
the name and identity is in any way expressive, regardless of 
its commercial exploitation.”  Id.  The court instead applied 
what it called a “sort of predominant use test”: 
If a product is being sold that predominantly 
exploits the commercial value of an individual‟s 
identity, that product should be held to violate 
the right of publicity and not be protected by the 
First Amendment, even if there is some 
„expressive‟ content in it that might qualify as 
„speech‟ in other circumstances.  If, on the other 
hand, the predominant purpose of the product is 
to make an expressive comment on or about a 
celebrity, the expressive values could be given 
greater weight. 
Id. (quoting Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial 
Confusion in Defining the Right of Publicity-Free Speech 
Interface, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 471, 500 (2003)).  The 
TCI court considered this to be a “more balanced balancing 
test [particularly for] cases where speech is both expressive 
and commercial.”  Id.  After applying the test, the court ruled 
for Twist, holding that “the metaphorical reference to Twist, 
though a literary device, has very little literary value 
compared to its commercial value.”  Id. 
 We decline Appellant‟s invitation to adopt this test.  
By our reading, the Predominant Use Test is subjective at 
best, arbitrary at worst, and in either case calls upon judges to 
act as both impartial jurists and discerning art critics.  These 
two roles cannot co-exist.  Indeed, Appellant suggests that 
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pursuant to this test we must evaluate “what value [Appellee 
is] adding to the First Amendment expressiveness [of NCAA 
Football] by appropriating the commercially valuable 
likeness?”  (Tr. at 14:15-:18.)  Since “[t]he game would have 
the exact same level of First Amendment expressiveness if 
[Appellee] didn‟t appropriate Mr. Hart‟s likeness,” Appellant 
urges us to find that NCAA Football fails the Predominant 
Use Test and therefore is not shielded by the First 
Amendment.  (Tr. at 7:10-12.)  Such reasoning, however, 
leads down a dangerous and rightly-shunned road: adopting 
Appellant‟s suggested analysis would be tantamount to 
admitting that it is proper for courts to analyze select 
elements of a work to determine how much they contribute to 
the entire work‟s expressiveness.  Moreover, as a necessary 
(and insidious) consequence, the Appellant‟s approach would 
suppose that there exists a broad range of seemingly 
expressive speech that has no First Amendment value.
15
 
 Appellee rightly argues that the Predominant Use Test 
is antithetical to our First Amendment precedent, (Tr. at 25:2-
:9), and we likewise reject the Test.
16
  We instead turn our 
                                              
15
 This concept is almost wholly foreign to free expression 
save for highly circumscribed categories of speech: obscenity, 
incitement, and fighting words.  See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. 
Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011). 
16
 We also agree with Chief Justice Bird‟s rejection of an 
identical argument:  “The right of publicity derived from 
public prominence does not confer a shield to ward off 
caricature, parody and satire.  Rather, prominence invites 
creative comment.”  Guglielmi, 603 P.2d at 460. 
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attention to the Rogers Test, which was proposed by Appellee 
and which draws its inspiration from trademark law. 
b.     The Rogers Test 
 The Rogers Test looks to the relationship between the 
celebrity image and the work as a whole.
17
  As the following 
discussion demonstrates, however, adopting this test would 
potentially immunize a broad swath of tortious activity.  We 
therefore reject the Rogers Test as inapposite in the instant 
case. 
i.     Origins and Scope of the Rogers Test 
 Various commentators have noted that right of 
publicity claims — at least those that address the use of a 
person‟s name or image in an advertisement — are akin to 
trademark claims because in both instances courts must 
balance the interests in protecting the relevant property right 
against the interest in free expression.  See, e.g., ETW Corp. 
v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 924 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(noting that “a Lanham Act false endorsement claim is the 
federal equivalent of the right of publicity” (citing Bruce P. 
Keller, The Right of Publicity: Past, Present, and Future, 
1207 PLI CORP. LAW & PRAC. HANDBOOK 159, 170 (2000))).  
                                              
17
 The various cases and scholarly sources refer to this test in 
three different ways: the Relatedness Test, the Restatement 
Test, and the Rogers Test.  The “Relatedness” moniker should 
be self-explanatory even at this early point in our discussion; 
the propriety of the other two names will become clear 
shortly.  For our purposes, we will refer to the test as the 
Rogers Test. 
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It is little wonder, then, that the inquiry championed by 
Appellee originated in a case that also focused upon alleged 
violations of the trademark-specific Lanham Act.  Rogers v. 
Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 In that case, Ginger Rogers brought suit against the 
producers and distributors of, Ginger and Fred, a film that 
was alleged to infringe on Rogers‟ right of publicity and 
confuse consumers in violation of the Act.  (Despite its title, 
the film was not about either Ginger Rogers or Fred Astaire.)  
In analyzing the right of publicity claim under Oregon law, 
the Second Circuit noted Oregon‟s “concern for the 
protection of free expression,” and held that Oregon would 
not “permit the right of publicity to bar the use of a 
celebrity‟s name in a movie title unless the title was wholly 
unrelated to the movie or was simply a disguised commercial 
advertisement for the sale of goods or services.”  Id. at 1004 
(internal quotation marks omitted).
18
  After applying this test, 
the Rogers court concluded that the right of publicity claim 
merited dismissal because “the title „Ginger and Fred‟ is 
                                              
18
 For support, the Rogers court looked to California and New 
York case law.  Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 427 
N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (App. Div. 1980) (“It is enough that the 
book is a literary work and not simply a disguised 
commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or services.”); 
Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 457 n.6 
(Cal. 1979) (“Such statements establish that this is not a case 
in which the use is wholly unrelated to the 
individual. . . . [T]his is not a case in which a celebrity‟s name 
is used to promote or endorse a collateral commercial product 
or is otherwise associated with a product or service in an 
advertisement.”). 
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clearly related to the content of the movie and is not a 
disguised advertisement for the sale of goods and services or 
a collateral commercial product.”  Id. at 1004-05.19 
 But while the test, as articulated in Rogers, arguably 
applied only to the use of celebrity identity in a work‟s title, 
Appellee suggests that the test can — and should — be 
applied more broadly.  For support, Appellee looks to the 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, released in 1995, 
which characterizes the tort as follows: 
One who appropriates the commercial value of 
a person‟s identity by using without consent the 
person‟s name, likeness, or other indicia of 
identity for purposes of trade is subject to 
liability for [appropriate relief]. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46.  In 
explaining the term “use for purposes of trade,” the 
Restatement notes that it does not “ordinarily include the use 
of a person‟s identity in news reporting, commentary, 
entertainment, works of fiction or nonfiction, or in advertising 
that is incidental to such uses.”  Id. § 47.   
                                              
19
 Still, it bears noting that while the Rogers Test was 
arguably forged in the crucible of trademark law — and the 
Rogers court appeared to consult trademark principles for 
inspiration — the court also pointed out that “the right of 
publicity, unlike the Lanham Act, has no likelihood of 
confusion requirement” and is therefore “potentially more 
expansive than the Lanham Act.”  Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 
F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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 Moreover, the comments to Section 47 of the 
Restatement also note that: 
[t]he right of publicity as recognized by statute 
and common law is fundamentally constrained 
by the public and constitutional interest in 
freedom of expression.  The use of a person‟s 
identity primarily for purpose of 
communicating information or expressing ideas 
is not generally actionable as a violation of the 
person‟s right of publicity. . . . Thus the use of a 
person‟s name or likeness in news reporting, 
whether in newspapers, magazines, or broadcast 
news, does not infringe the right of publicity.  
The interest in freedom of expression also 
extends to use in entertainment and other 
creative works, including both fiction and 
nonfiction.  The use of a celebrity‟s name or 
photograph as part of an article published in a 
fan magazine or in a feature story broadcast on 
an entertainment program, for example, will not 
infringe the celebrity‟s right of publicity.  
Similarly, the right of publicity is not infringed 
by the dissemination of an unauthorized print or 
broadcast biography.  Use of another‟s identity 
in a novel, play, or motion picture is also not 
ordinarily an infringement. . . . However, if the 
name or likeness is used solely to attract 
attention to a work that is not related to the 
identified person, the user may be subject to 
liability for a use of the other’s identity in 
advertising. 
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Id. at § 47 cmt. c (emphasis added).  Appellee argues that the 
above language adopts the Rogers Test and applies it to right 
of publicity claims dealing with any part of a work, not only 
its title.  Appellee also cites to a number of cases purportedly 
supporting its position.  See, e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 
329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003); Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 
F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1994).  We do not find any of these cases 
particularly persuasive. 
 In Matthews, for example, the Fifth Circuit considered 
whether a fictional novel incorporating events from the life of 
an undercover narcotics officer violated the officer‟s right of 
publicity.  In setting out the legal standard for a right of 
publicity claim, the court noted that it made no difference 
“whether [the book] is viewed as an historical or a fictional 
work, so long as it is not simply a disguised commercial 
advertisement for the sale of goods or services.”  Matthews, 
15 F.3d at 440 (quotation marks and internal citations 
omitted).  This single, cryptic quotation notwithstanding, the 
court ultimately held in favor of the book‟s author after 
applying a wholly different — and seemingly inapposite — 
First Amendment analysis: actual malice.
20
  See id. 
(“[A]bsent a showing of actual malice . . . [the book] is 
protected by the First Amendment.”). 
                                              
20
 In Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), 
the Supreme Court clarified its holding in Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), as 
standing for the proposition that “the „actual malice‟ standard 
does not apply to the tort of appropriation of a right of 
publicity.”  Hustler, 485 U.S. at 52. 
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 But where Matthews took an ambivalent position, the 
Sixth Circuit seemed — at least for a short time — to 
embrace the Rogers Test.  In Parks v. LaFace Records, the 
Sixth Circuit was asked to determine whether a rap song 
entitled Rosa Parks infringed on the Civil Rights icon‟s right 
of publicity.  Parks, 329 F.3d at 441-42.  After noting that 
Rogers was decided in the context of a movie, the Sixth 
Circuit held that an expansion of the test to “the context of 
other expressive works [was supported] by comment c of § 47 
of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition.”  Id. at 
461.  Consequently, the Sixth Circuit ruled that there was an 
issue of material fact as to whether the title of the song 
(“Rosa Parks”) was “wholly unrelated” to the lyrics.  Id.  We 
find Parks to be less than persuasive given that just over a 
month later another panel of the Sixth Circuit decided ETW 
Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., a right of publicity case where 
the Circuit applied the Transformative Use Test.  See 332 
F.3d 915, 937 (6th Cir. 2003).
21
 
 Interestingly, this is not the first time that we have 
considered the proper scope of the Rogers Test.  Indeed, we 
expressed doubt (albeit in dicta) over whether the Test could 
apply beyond the title of a work in Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, 
Inc., 542 F.3d 1007 (3d Cir. 2008), a case centering on a suit 
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 To be fair, the ETW court did briefly mention the Rogers 
decision before engaging in a lengthy discussion of the 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, ultimately 
concluding that the Restatement stood for the rather mundane 
principle that a right of publicity implicates a balancing test.  
ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 930-36.  As we noted above, the 
balancing utilized by the ETW court was the Transformative 
Use Test. 
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by the estate of a well-known sports narrator against a sports 
film production company for Lanham Act violations and 
breach of the narrator‟s right of publicity.  In analyzing the 
trademark claim, we expressed hesitation at extending the 
Rogers Test beyond the title of a work, adding that few other 
courts had done so at the time of our decision.  Id. at 1018.  
Nothing in Appellee‟s argument has swayed us from this 
position and we thus remain skeptical that the Rogers Test 
applies to the general contents of a work when analyzing right 
of publicity claims. 
ii.     Analysis of the Rogers Test 
 Ultimately, we find that the Rogers Test does not 
present the proper analytical approach for cases such as the 
one at bar.  While the Test may have a use in trademark-like 
right of publicity cases, it is inapposite here.  We are 
concerned that this test is a blunt instrument, unfit for 
widespread application in cases that require a carefully 
calibrated balancing of two fundamental protections: the right 
of free expression and the right to control, manage, and profit 
from one‟s own identity. 
 The potential problem with applying the Rogers Test 
in this case is demonstrated by the following statement from 
Appellee‟s brief: 
Because, as a former college football player, 
Hart‟s likeness is not „wholly unrelated‟ to 
NCAA Football and the game is not a 
commercial advertisement for some unrelated 
product, Hart . . . does not try to meet 
the . . . test. 
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(Appellee‟s Br. at 24.)  Effectively, Appellee argues that 
Appellant should be unable to assert a claim for appropriating 
his likeness as a football player precisely because his likeness 
was used for a game about football.  Adopting this line of 
reasoning threatens to turn the right of publicity on its head. 
 Appellant‟s career as a college football player suggests 
that the target audience for his merchandise and performances 
(e.g., his actual matches) would be sports fans.  It is only 
logical, then, that products appropriating and exploiting his 
identity would fare best — and thereby would provide ne‟er-
do-wells with the greatest incentive — when targeted at the 
sports-fan market segment.  Given that Appellant played 
intercollegiate football, however, products targeting the 
sports-fan market would, as a matter of course, relate to him.  
Yet under Appellee‟s approach, all such uses would be 
protected.  It cannot be that the very activity by which 
Appellant achieved his renown now prevents him from 
protecting his hard-won celebrity.  We decline to endorse 
such a conclusion and therefore reject the Rogers test as 
inapplicable.
22
 
 On the other hand, we do agree with the Rogers court 
in so far as it noted that the right of publicity does not 
implicate the potential for consumer confusion and is 
therefore potentially broader than the protections offered by 
                                              
22
 We recognize that in Brown v. Elec. Arts, No. 2:09-cv-
01598-FMC-RZ, 2009 WL 8763151 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 
2009), the District Court applied the Rogers test in analyzing 
another EA sports game: Madden NFL.  Note, however, that 
the case did not involve a right of publicity claim, but a claim 
under the Lanham Act.  Id. at *1-2. 
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the Lanham Act.  Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004.  Indeed, therein 
lies the weakness of comparing the right of publicity to 
trademark protections: the right of publicity is broader and, 
by extension, protects a greater swath of property interests.  
Thus, it would be unwise for us to adopt a test that hews so 
closely to traditional trademark principles.  Instead, we need a 
broader, more nuanced test, which helps balance the interests 
at issue in cases such as the one at bar.  The final test — the 
Transformative Use Test — provides just such an approach. 
c.     The Transformative Use Test 
 Looking to intellectual property law for guidance on 
how to balance property interests against the First 
Amendment has merit.  We need only shift our gaze away 
from trademark, to the broader vista of copyright law.  Thus, 
we come to the case of Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary 
Saderup, Inc., which imported the concept of 
“transformative” use from copyright law into the right of 
publicity context.  21 P.3d 797, 804-08 (Cal. 2001).  This 
concept lies at the core of a test that both Appellant and 
Appellee agree is applicable to this case: the Transformative 
Use Test.
23
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 Unlike in New Jersey, California‟s right of publicity is a 
matter of both the state‟s statutory law and its common law.  
Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (discussing both the statutory and the common law 
cause of action); see also Cal. Civ. Code § 3344; Eastwood v. 
Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).  
This difference notwithstanding, the laws are strikingly 
similar — and protect similar interests.  Under California law, 
“any person who knowingly uses another‟s name . . . or 
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i.     Genesis of the Transformative Use Test 
 The Transformative Use Test was first articulated by 
the Supreme Court of California in Comedy III.  That case 
concerned an artist‟s production and sale of t-shirts and prints 
bearing a charcoal drawing of the Three Stooges.  The 
California court determined that while “[t]he right of 
publicity is often invoked in the context of commercial 
speech,” it could also apply in instances where the speech is 
merely expressive.  Id. at 802-803.  The court also noted, 
however, that when addressing expressive speech, “the very 
importance of celebrities in society means that the right of 
publicity has the potential of censoring significant expression 
by suppressing alternative versions of celebrity images that 
are iconoclastic, irreverent or otherwise attempt to redefine 
the celebrity‟s meaning.”  Id. at 803.  Thus, while the “the 
right of publicity cannot, consistent with the First 
Amendment, be a right to control the celebrity‟s image by 
censoring disagreeable portrayals,” id. at 807, the right, like 
                                                                                                     
likeness, in any manner, or in any products, merchandise, or 
goods, or for the purposes of advertising or selling, or 
soliciting purchases of . . . shall be liable for any damages 
sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof.”  
Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(a).  In the words of the California 
Supreme Court, “the right of publicity is essentially an 
economic right.  What the right of publicity holder possesses 
is not a right of censorship, but a right to prevent others from 
misappropriating the economic value generated by the 
celebrity‟s fame . . . .”  Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 807.  This is 
analogous to the conceptualization of the right of publicity in 
New Jersey, and we consequently see no issue in applying 
balancing tests developed in California to New Jersey. 
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copyright, nonetheless offers protection to a form of 
intellectual property that society deems to have social utility, 
id. at 804. 
 After briefly considering whether to import the “fair 
use” analysis from copyright, the Comedy III court decided 
that only the first fair use factor, “the purpose and character 
of the use,” was appropriate.  Id. at 808.  Specifically, the 
Comedy III court found persuasive the Supreme Court‟s 
holding in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. that  
the central purpose of the inquiry into this fair 
use factor „is to see . . . whether the new work 
merely “supercede[s] the objects” of the 
original creation, or instead adds something 
new, with a further purpose or different 
character, altering the first with new expression, 
meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, 
whether and to what extent the new work is 
“transformative.” 
Id. (emphasis added) (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)).   
 Going further, the court explained that works 
containing “significant transformative elements” are less 
likely to interfere with the economic interests implicated by 
the right of publicity.  For example, “works of parody or other 
distortions of the celebrity figure are not, from the celebrity 
fan‟s viewpoint, good substitutes for conventional depictions 
of the celebrity and therefore do not generally threaten 
markets for celebrity memorabilia that the right of publicity is 
designed to protect.”  Id.  The court was also careful to 
emphasize that “the transformative elements or creative 
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contributions” in a work may include — under the right 
circumstances — factual reporting, fictionalized portrayal, 
heavy-handed lampooning, and subtle social criticism.  Id. at 
809 (“The inquiry is in a sense more quantitative than 
qualitative, asking whether the literal and imitative or the 
creative elements predominate in the work.”).24 
 Restating its newly-articulated test, the Supreme Court 
of California held that the balance between the right of 
publicity and First Amendment interests turns on 
[w]hether the celebrity likeness is one of the 
“raw materials” from which an original work is 
synthesized, or whether the depiction or 
imitation of the celebrity is the very sum and 
substance of the work in question.  We ask, in 
other words, whether the product containing a 
celebrity’s likeness is so transformed that it has 
become primarily the defendant’s own 
expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness.  
And when we use the word “expression,” we 
mean expression of something other than the 
likeness of the celebrity. 
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 The court in Comedy III also added an ancillary question to 
its inquiry: “does the marketability and economic value of the 
challenged work derive primarily from the fame of the 
celebrity depicted?”  Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 810.  If not, then 
“there would generally be no actionable right of publicity.”  
Id.  However, the inverse is not necessarily true: even if the 
work does derive its value principally from the celebrity‟s 
depiction, “it may still be a transformative work.”  Id. 
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Id. (emphasis added).   
 Applying this test, the court concluded that charcoal 
portraits of the Three Stooges did violate the Stooges‟ rights 
of publicity, holding that the court could “discern no 
significant transformative or creative contribution” and that 
“the marketability and economic value of [the work] derives 
primarily from the fame of the celebrities depicted.”  Id. at 
811. 
ii.     Application of the Transformative Use Test 
 Given its relative recency, few courts have applied the 
Transformative Use Test, and consequently there is not a 
significant body of case law related to its application.  
Nonetheless, a handful of cases bear mention as they help 
frame our inquiry. 
 In 2003, the Supreme Court of California revisited the 
Transformative Use Test when two musicians, Johnny and 
Edgar Winter, who both possessed long white hair and albino 
features, brought suit against a comic book company over 
images of two villainous half-man, half-worm creatures, both 
with long white hair and albino features, named Johnny and 
Edgar Autumn.  Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 476 (Cal. 
2003).  As the brothers‟ right of publicity claims necessarily 
implicated DC Comics‟ First Amendment rights, the Winter 
court looked to the Transformative Use Test.  In summarizing 
the test, the court explained that “[a]n artist depicting a 
celebrity must contribute something more than a „merely 
trivial‟ variation, [but must create] something recognizably 
„his own,‟ in order to qualify for legal protection.”  Id. at 478 
(alteration in original) (quoting Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 810-
11).  Thus, in applying the test, the Winter court held that  
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[a]lthough the fictional characters Johnny and 
Edgar Autumn are less-than-subtle evocations 
of Johnny and Edgar Winter, the books do not 
depict plaintiffs literally.  Instead, plaintiffs are 
merely part of the raw materials from which the 
comic books were synthesized.  To the extent 
the drawings of the Autumn brothers resemble 
plaintiffs at all, they are distorted for purposes 
of lampoon, parody, or caricature.  And the 
Autumn brothers are but cartoon characters — 
half-human and half-worm — in a larger story, 
which is itself quite expressive. 
Id. at 479.  The court therefore found that “fans who want to 
purchase pictures of [the Winter brothers] would find the 
drawing of the Autumn brothers unsatisfactory as a substitute 
for conventional depictions.”  Id.25  Consequently, the court 
rejected the brothers‟ claims for a right of publicity violation. 
 Also in 2003, the Sixth Circuit decided ETW, a case 
focusing on a photograph of Tiger Woods set among a 
collage of other, golf-related photographs.  As we previously 
noted, while ETW mentioned both the Rogers case and the 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, the test it 
ultimately applied was a combination of an ad-hoc approach 
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 The Winter court also found unpersuasive arguments that 
the comic books were marketed by “trading on [the brothers‟] 
likenesses and reputations to generate interest in the comic 
book series.”  Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 479 (Cal. 
2003).  The court held that considerations of marketing 
strategy were “irrelevant” because the “question is whether 
the work is transformative, not how it is marketed.”  Id. 
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and the Transformative Use Test.  See ETW, 332 F.3d at 937-
38.  In holding that the collage “contain[ed] significant 
transformative elements,” id. at 938, the court compared it to 
the Three Stooges portraits from Comedy III, and noted that 
the collage “does not capitalize solely on a literal depiction of 
Woods.”  Id.  Instead, the “work consists of a collage of 
images in addition to Woods‟s image which are combined to 
describe, in artistic form, a historic event in sports history and 
to convey a message about the significance of Woods‟s 
achievement in that event.”  Id.; see also Comedy III, 21 P.3d 
at 809 (noting that “transformative elements or creative 
contributions . . . can take many forms”). 
 ETW presents an archetypical example of a case falling 
somewhere in the middle of Transformative Use Test 
jurisprudence, given that it focuses on the use of photographs 
(literal depictions of celebrities), but adds a transformative 
aspect to the work, thereby altering the meaning behind the 
use of the celebrity‟s likeness.  Arguably, the Comedy III and 
Winter decisions bookend the spectrum of cases applying the 
Transformative Use Test.  Where Comedy III presents a clear 
example of a non-transformative use (i.e., mere literal 
depictions of celebrities recreated in a different medium), 
Winter offers a use that is highly transformative (i.e., fanciful 
characters, placed amidst a fanciful setting, that draw 
inspiration from celebrities).  As with ETW, however, most of 
the cases discussed below (along with the instant case), fall 
somewhere between these two decisions.  This same 
analytical approach — focusing on whether and how the 
celebrity‟s likeness is transformed — appears in decisions by 
courts applying the Transformative Use Test to video games, 
an area of law which we consider next. 
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iii.     The Transformative Use Test and Video Games 
 In mid-2006, the California Court of Appeal decided 
Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2006), which addressed a musician‟s right of publicity 
claim against a video game company.  Specifically, the 
musician (Kierin Kirby) had claimed that Sega 
misappropriated her likeness and signature phrases for 
purposes of creating the character of Ulala, a reporter in the 
far flung future.  In applying the Transformative Use Test, the 
court noted that not only did Kirby‟s signature phrases 
included “ooh la la” but that both she and the videogame 
character would often use phrases like “groove,” “meow,” 
“dee-lish,” and “I won‟t give up.”  Id. at 613.  The court also 
found similarities in appearance between Kirby and Ulala, 
based on hair style and clothing choice.  Id.  At the same 
time, the court held that differences between the two did exist 
— both in appearance and movement — and that Ulala was 
not a mere digital recreation of Kirby.  Id.  Thus, the court 
concluded that Ulala passed the Transformative Use Test, 
rejecting Kirby‟s argument that the differences between her 
and the character added no additional meaning or message to 
the work.  Id. at 616-17 (“A work is transformative if it adds 
„new expression.‟  That expression alone is sufficient; it need 
not convey any „meaning or message.‟”); see also id. at 617 
(“[A]ny imitation of Kirby‟s likeness or identity in Ulala is 
not the sum and substance of that character.”). 
 Several years later, in early 2011, the California courts 
again confronted the right of publicity as it related to video 
games in No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc., 122 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 397 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).  The case centered on 
Band Hero, a game that allows player to “simulate 
performing in a rock band in time with popular songs” by 
43 
 
selecting digital avatars to represent them in an in-game band.  
Id. at 401.  Some of the avatars were digital recreations of 
real-life musicians, including members of the band No 
Doubt.
26
  After a contract dispute broke off relations between 
the band and the company, No Doubt sued, claiming a 
violation of their rights of publicity.  The California Court of 
Appeal applied the Transformative Use Test. 
 The No Doubt court began by noting that “in stark 
contrast to the „fanciful creative characters‟ in Winter and 
Kirby,” the No Doubt avatars could not be altered by players 
and thus remained “at all times immutable images of the real 
celebrity musicians.”  Id. at 410.  But this fact, by itself, did 
not end the court‟s inquiry since “even literal reproductions of 
celebrities can be „transformed‟ into expressive works based 
on the context into which the celebrity image is placed.”  Id. 
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 According to the decision, 
members of No Doubt participated in a full-day 
motion capture photography session at 
Activision‟s studios so that the band members‟ 
Band Hero avatars would accurately reflect 
their appearances, movements, and sounds.  No 
Doubt then closely reviewed the motion capture 
photography and the details related to the 
appearance and features of their avatars to 
ensure the representations would meet with 
approval.  The end results are avatars that 
closely match the appearance of each of the No 
Doubt band members. 
No Doubt, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 402.  
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(citing Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 811).  Looking to the context of 
the Band Hero game, the court found that “no matter what 
else occurs in the game during the depiction of the No Doubt 
avatars, the avatars perform rock songs, the same activity by 
which the band achieved and maintains its fame.”  Id. at 410-
11 (emphasis added).  The court explained: 
[T]he avatars perform [rock] songs as literal 
recreations of the band members.  That the 
avatars can be manipulated to perform at 
fanciful venues including outer space or to sing 
songs the real band would object to singing, or 
that the avatars appear in the context of a 
videogame that contains many other creative 
elements, does not transform the avatars into 
anything other than the exact depictions of No 
Doubt‟s members doing exactly what they do as 
celebrities. 
Id. at 411 (emphasis added).
27
  As a final step in its analysis, 
the court noted that Activision‟s use of highly realistic digital 
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 For support, the No Doubt court relied on the Ninth 
Circuit‟s decision in Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, where our 
sister court held that a greeting card depicting Paris Hilton‟s 
head on a cartoon waitress accompanied by the line “that‟s 
hot” was not transformative and thus infringed on Hilton‟s 
right of publicity.  599 F.3d 894, 911 (9th Cir. 2010) (“While 
a work need not be phantasmagoric as in Winter or fanciful as 
in Kirby in order to be transformative, there is enough doubt 
as to whether Hallmark‟s card is transformative under our 
case law that we cannot say Hallmark is entitled to the 
defense . . . .”). 
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depictions of No Doubt was motivated by a desire to 
capitalize on the band‟s fan-base, “because it encourages 
[fans] to purchase the game so as to perform as, or alongside, 
the members of No Doubt.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Given all 
this, the court concluded that Activision‟s use of No Doubt‟s 
likenesses did infringe on the band‟s rights of publicity.  Id. at 
411-12.
28
 
iv.     Analysis of the Transformative Use Test 
 Like the Predominant Use and Rogers tests, the 
Transformative Use Test aims to balance the interest 
protected by the right of publicity against those interests 
preserved by the First Amendment.  In our view, the 
Transformative Use Test appears to strike the best balance 
because it provides courts with a flexible — yet uniformly 
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 Before moving on, it behooves us to mention a pair of cases 
decided in the Northern District of California:  Davis v. Elec. 
Arts Inc., No. 10-cv-03328, 2012 WL 3860819 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 29, 2012); Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 09-cv-01967, 
2010 WL 530108 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010).  Both cases 
concern right of publicity claims asserted against EA for use 
of football players‟ likenesses in their game franchises.  Davis 
related to EA‟s Madden NFL games while Keller is simply 
our own case incarnated in California.  In both disputes the 
court applied the Transformative Use Test, and in both 
instances the court decided that EA‟s use of the players‟ 
likenesses failed the Test.  Davis, 2012 WL 3860819, at *5-6; 
Keller, 2010 WL 530108, at *3-5.  We note these cases in 
passing only because they are both currently on appeal before 
the Ninth Circuit and we feel it imprudent to rely too heavily 
on decisions that our sister court is still considering. 
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applicable — analytical framework.  Specifically, the 
Transformative Use Test seems to excel precisely where the 
other two tests falter.  Unlike the Rogers Test, the 
Transformative Use Test maintains a singular focus on 
whether the work sufficiently transforms the celebrity‟s 
identity or likeness, thereby allowing courts to account for the 
fact that misappropriation can occur in any market segment, 
including those related to the celebrity.   
 On the other hand, unlike the Predominant Use Test, 
applying the Transformative Use Test requires a more 
circumscribed inquiry, focusing on the specific aspects of a 
work that speak to whether it was merely created to exploit a 
celebrity‟s likeness.  This test therefore recognizes that if 
First Amendment protections are to mean anything in right of 
publicity claims, courts must begin by considering the extent 
to which a work is the creator‟s own expression.29 
 Additionally, the Transformative Use Test best 
comports with the cautionary language present in various 
right of publicity cases.  Specifically, we believe that an 
initial focus on the creative aspects of a work helps address 
our own concern from Facenda, where we noted that “courts 
must circumscribe the right of publicity.”  Facenda, 542 F.3d 
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 While we acknowledge that the test in Comedy III included 
a question as to whether the “marketability and economic 
value of [the work] derive primarily from the fame of the 
celebrities depicted,” Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 810, we note that 
this is a secondary question.  The court in Comedy III rightly 
recognized that the balancing inquiry suggested by the 
Supreme Court in Zacchini cannot start and stop with 
commercial purpose or value. 
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at 1032.  As our discussion below demonstrates, the 
Transformative Use Test effectively restricts right of publicity 
claims to a very narrow universe of expressive works.  
Moreover, we believe that the Transformative Use Test best 
exemplifies the methodology suggested by Justice Powell‟s 
dissent in Zacchini: 
Rather than begin with a quantitative analysis of 
the performer‟s behavior — is this or is this not 
his entire act? — we should direct initial 
attention to the actions of the news media: what 
use did the station make of the film footage?  
When a film is used, as here, for a routine 
portion of a regular news program, I would hold 
that the First Amendment protects the station 
from a “right of publicity” or “appropriation” 
suit, absent a strong showing by the plaintiff 
that the news broadcast was a subterfuge or 
cover for private or commercial exploitation. 
Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 581 (Powell, J., dissenting).  Consistent 
with Justice Powell‟s argument, the Transformative Use Test 
begins by asking “what use did the [defendant] make of the 
[celebrity identity]?”  Id.30 
 Finally, we find that of the three tests, the 
Transformative Use Test is the most consistent with other 
courts‟ ad hoc approaches to right of publicity cases.  For 
                                              
30
 While the Predominant Use Test may appear to accomplish 
the same task, we think it does not.  In point of fact, it merely 
looks to the expressive “value” of a celebrity‟s identity, not 
its use, vis-à-vis the challenged work. 
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example, a majority of the Supreme Court of California in 
Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions argued
31
 that the 
“fictionalized version” of a late actor‟s life, “depicting the 
actor‟s name, likeness and personality without 
obtaining . . . prior consent” was entitled to protection from a 
right of publicity claim.  603 P.2d at 455, 457-59.
32
  In 
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 The Supreme Court of California affirmed the lower court‟s 
decision to dismiss the case without engaging with the right 
of publicity claim beyond noting that the right “expires upon 
the death of the person so protected.”  Guglielmi, 603 P.2d at 
455.  The Chief Justice‟s concurring opinion, joined by a 
majority of the court, provided a full analysis of the issue, and 
in subsequent years has been treated as the Court‟s majority 
opinion.  See Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 803 (citing the Guglielmi 
concurrence while noting that “[a] majority of this court” had 
agreed to its reasoning); see also Guglielmi, 603 P.2d at 464 
(Newman, J., concurring) (“I concur in the discussion in the 
Chief Justice‟s opinion that sets forth principles for 
determining whether an action based on the invasion of an 
individual's right of publicity may be maintained in the face 
of a claim that the challenged use is an exercise of freedom of 
expression.”). 
32
 After noting that the movie was protected despite being a 
work of fiction that was made for profit, Guglielmi, 603 P.2d 
at 458-59, Chief Justice Bird rejected the contention that 
defendants “could have expressed themselves without using 
[the actor‟s] name and likeness,” arguing that “[n]o author 
should be forced into creating mythological worlds or 
characters wholly divorced from reality.  The right of 
publicity derived from public prominence does not confer a 
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essence, the actor‟s identity was sufficiently transformed by 
the fictional elements in the book so as to tip the balance of 
interests in favor of the First Amendment.  See id. at 457 
(Bird, C.J., concurring).  Likewise, in Estate of Presley v. 
Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981), the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey held that an Elvis 
impersonator‟s act was subject to right of publicity claims 
because “entertainment that is merely a copy or imitation, 
even if skillfully and accurately carried out, does not really 
have its own creative component and does not have a 
significant value as pure entertainment.”  Id. at 1359 
(emphasis added).  Seen through the lens of the 
Transformative Use Test, the Russen decision demonstrates 
that where no additional transformative elements are present 
— i.e., the work contains “merely a copy or imitation” of the 
celebrity‟s identity — then there can be no First Amendment 
impediment to a right of publicity claim.
33
  Additionally, in 
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 
F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996), which focused on the use of 
baseball players‟ identities for parody trading cards, the 
                                                                                                     
shield to ward off caricature, parody and satire.  Rather, 
prominence invites creative comment.”  Id. at 459-60. 
33
 The court‟s “recognition that defendant‟s production has 
some [First Amendment] value,” did not diminish its 
conclusion that “the primary purpose of defendant‟s activity 
[was] to appropriate the commercial value of the likeness of 
Elvis Presley.”  Russen, 513 F. Supp. at 1360.  In this regard 
the court analogized the case to Zacchini, holding that the 
Elvis impersonator had “appropriated the „very activity [live 
stage show] by which [Presley initially] acquired his 
reputation.”  Id. at 1361 (alteration in original). 
50 
 
transformative nature of the caricatures on the cards (and the 
parodic text about the players‟ “statistics”) was sufficient to 
quash any right of publicity claim.  Id. at 972-73 (“Because 
celebrities are an important part of our public vocabulary, a 
parody of a celebrity does not merely lampoon the celebrity, 
but exposes the weakness of the idea or value that the 
celebrity symbolizes in society.”).34 
 It is little wonder, then, that the Comedy III decision 
looked to all three of these cases for guidance in defining the 
Transformative Use Test.  See Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 806-
09.
35
  The fact that such prior holdings can be reconciled with 
the Test not only bolsters our views as to its propriety, but 
                                              
34
 The Tenth Circuit also considered the economic incentives 
underlying the right of publicity.  See Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 
973-74.  After a close examination, the court recognized only 
one principal benefit for celebrities from having control over 
works of parody: “control over the potential effect the parody 
would have on the market for nonparodic use of one‟s 
identity.”  Id. at 974.  However, the court quickly added that 
parody “rarely acts as a market substitute for the original.”  
Id.  As a consequence, the court ruled in favor of the card 
manufacturer.  
35
 We note here that, by our reading, the Transformative Use 
Test best comports with the language in RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. c.  While we 
acknowledge that other courts have read the Restatement as 
adopting the Rogers Test, we believe that the various 
examples listed in Comment C all exemplify the sort of 
transformative uses that would generally pass the analysis set 
forth in Comedy III. 
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also ensures that adopting the Transformative Use Test does 
not result in the sort of backward-looking jurisprudential 
revision that might disturb prior protections for expressive 
speech.
36
  Quite to the contrary, adopting the Test ensures that 
already-existing First Amendment protections in right of 
publicity cases apply to video games with the same force as to 
“biographies, documentaries, docudramas, and other 
expressive works depicting real-life figures.”  (Dissent Op. at 
6.) 
 In light of the above discussion, we find that the 
Transformative Use Test is the proper analytical framework 
to apply to cases such as the one at bar.  Consequently, we 
now apply the test to the facts of the instance case. 
C.     Application 
 In applying the Transformative Use Test to the instant 
case, we must determine whether Appellant‟s identity is 
sufficiently transformed in NCAA Football.  As we mentioned 
earlier, we use the term “identity” to encompass not only 
Appellant‟s likeness, but also his biographical information.  It 
is the combination of these two parts — which, when 
                                              
36
 Indeed, in compiling its non-exhaustive list of 
“transformative elements or creative components,” the 
Comedy III court looked for examples from previous 
decisions — including Guglielmi, Cardtoons, and even Parks.  
See Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 809-10. 
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combined, identify the digital avatar as an in-game recreation 
of Appellant — that must be sufficiently transformed.37 
 Having thus cabined our inquiry to the appropriate 
form of Appellant‟s identity, we note that — based on the 
combination of both the digital avatar‟s appearance and the 
biographical and identifying information — the digital avatar 
does closely resemble the genuine article.  Not only does the 
digital avatar match Appellant in terms of hair color, hair 
style and skin tone, but the avatar‟s accessories mimic those 
worn by Appellant during his time as a Rutgers player.  The 
information, as has already been noted, also accurately tracks 
Appellant‟s vital and biographical details.  And while the 
inexorable march of technological progress may make some 
of the graphics in earlier editions of NCAA Football look 
dated or overly-computerized, we do not believe that video 
game graphics must reach (let alone cross) the uncanny valley 
to support a right of publicity claim.
38
  If we are to find some 
                                              
37
 This joint focus on both likeness and identifying 
information avoids a conflict with C.B.C. Distribution & 
Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 
505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007), which held that use of major 
league baseball players‟ records in a fantasy baseball game 
was protected by the First Amendment even against right of 
publicity claims because such information was publicly 
available.  Id. at 823-24.  The presence of a digital avatar that 
recreates Appellant in a digital medium differentiates this 
matter from C.B.C. 
38
 It remains an open question, however, whether right of 
publicity claims can extend into the bygone days of 8-bit 
graphics and pixilated representations. 
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transformative element, we must look somewhere other than 
just the in-game digital recreation of Appellant.
39
  Cases such 
as ETW and No Doubt, both of which address realistic digital 
depictions of celebrities, point to the next step in our analysis: 
context. 
 Considering the context within which the digital avatar 
exists — effectively, looking at how Appellant‟s identity is 
“incorporated into and transformed by” NCAA Football, 
(Dissent Op. at 6) — provides little support for Appellee‟s 
arguments.  The digital Ryan Hart does what the actual Ryan 
Hart did while at Rutgers: he plays college football, in digital 
recreations of college football stadiums, filled with all the 
trappings of a college football game.  This is not 
transformative; the various digitized sights and sounds in the 
video game do not alter or transform the Appellant‟s identity 
in a significant way.  See No Doubt, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 410-
11 (“[N]o matter what else occurs in the game during the 
depiction of the No Doubt avatars, the avatars perform rock 
                                              
39
 It is no answer to say that digitizing Appellant‟s appearance 
in and of itself works a transformative use.  Recreating a 
celebrity‟s likeness or identity in some medium other than 
photographs or video cannot, without more, satisfy the test; 
this would turn the inquiry on its head — and would 
contradict the very basis for the Transformative Use Test.  
See, e.g., Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 809 (applying the 
Transformative Use Test to charcoal drawings of the Three 
Stooges); see also Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 
1339, 1359 (D.N.J. 1981) (“[E]ntertainment that is merely a 
copy or imitation, even if skillfully and accurately carried out, 
does not really have its own creative component and does not 
have a significant value as pure entertainment.”). 
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songs, the same activity by which the band achieved and 
maintains its fame.”).  Indeed, the lack of transformative 
context is even more pronounced here than in No Doubt, 
where members of the band could perform and sing in outer 
space. 
 Even here, however, our inquiry is not at an end.  For 
as much as the digital representation and context evince no 
meaningful transformative element in NCAA Football, a third 
avatar-specific element is also present: the users‟ ability to 
alter the avatar‟s appearance.  This distinguishing factor 
ensures that we cannot dispose of this case as simply as the 
court in No Doubt.  See No Doubt, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 410 
(noting that the digital avatars representing No Doubt were 
“at all times immutable images of the real celebrity 
musicians”).  Indeed, the ability for users to change the avatar 
accounted, in large part, for the District Court‟s deciding that 
NCAA Football satisfied the Transformative Use Test.  See 
Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 785.
40
  We must therefore consider 
                                              
40
 To be clear, the District Court focused specifically on the 
ability to alter the digital avatars, not on the alterations 
themselves: 
[I]t is not the user's alteration of Hart's image 
that is critical.  What matters for my analysis of 
EA's First Amendment right is that EA created 
the mechanism by which the virtual player may 
be altered, as well as the multiple permutations 
available for each virtual player image. 
Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 785.  That is, the court below did not 
look to the users‟ creations as proxies for Appellee‟s 
expression.  While we disagree with its final decision, we 
55 
 
to what extent the ability to alter a digital avatar represents a 
transformative use of Appellant‟s identity. 
 At the outset, we note that the mere presence of this 
feature, without more, cannot satisfy the Transformative Use 
Test.  True, interactivity is the basis upon which First 
Amendment protection is granted to video games in the first 
instance.
41
  See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733.  However, the 
balancing test in right of publicity cases does not look to 
whether a particular work loses First Amendment protection.  
Rather, the balancing inquiry looks to see whether the 
interests protected by the right of publicity are sufficient to 
surmount the already-existing First Amendment protections.  
See, e.g., Guglielmi, 603 P.2d at 458 (considering whether 
right of publicity protections “outweigh[] any protection [the] 
expression would otherwise enjoy under the [First 
Amendment]”).  As Zacchini demonstrated, the right of 
publicity can triumph even when an essential element for 
First Amendment protection is present.  In that case, the 
human cannonball act was broadcast as part of the newscast.  
See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 563.  To hold, therefore, that a 
video game should satisfy the Transformative Use Test 
simply because it includes a particular interactive feature 
                                                                                                     
agree with the District Court‟s careful navigation of this 
point. 
41
 We note, too, that all games are interactive — that is a 
product of the medium.  Identifying an interactive feature that 
acts upon the celebrity‟s likeness, therefore, is only the first 
step in the analysis. 
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would lead to improper results.  Interactivity cannot be an end 
onto itself.
42
 
 Moreover, we are wary of converting the ability to 
alter a digital avatar from mere feature to talisman, thereby 
opening the door to cynical abuse.  If the mere presence of the 
feature were enough, video game companies could commit 
the most blatant acts of misappropriation only to absolve 
themselves by including a feature that allows users to modify 
the digital likenesses.  We cannot accept that such an outcome 
would adequately balance the interests in right of publicity 
cases.  As one amicus brief noted: 
[U]nder [Appellee‟s] application of the 
transformative test [sic], presumably no 
infringement would be found if individuals such 
as the Dalai Lama and the Pope were placed 
within a violent “shoot-em-up” game, so long 
as the game include[d] a “mechanism” by 
which the user could manipulate their 
characteristics. 
(Screen Actors Guild, Inc. et al., Amicus Br. at 21.
43
)  With 
this concern in mind, therefore, we consider whether the type 
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 The other side of this coin is equally true: interactivity is 
not the sine qua non of transformative use.  Works involving 
video games may still be transformative even where no 
specific interactive features affect the celebrity likeness.  See, 
e.g., Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2006). 
43
 We do not discount the possibility that such a game — 
given the juxtaposition of spiritual leaders and the hyper 
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and extent of interactivity permitted is sufficient to transform 
the Appellant‟s likeness into the Appellee‟s own expression.  
We hold that it does not. 
 In NCAA Football, Appellee seeks to create a realistic 
depiction of college football for the users.  Part of this realism 
involves generating realistic representations of the various 
college teams — which includes the realistic representations 
of the players.  Like Activision in No Doubt, therefore, 
Appellee seeks to capitalize on the respective fan bases for 
the various teams and players.  Indeed, as the District Court 
recognized, “it seems ludicrous to question whether video 
game consumers enjoy and, as a result, purchase more EA-
produced video games as a result of the heightened realism 
associated with actual players.”  Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 783 
(quoting James J.S. Holmes & Kanika D. Corley, Defining 
Liability for Likeness of Athlete Avatars in Video Games, 
L.A. LAW., May 2011, at 17, 20).  Moreover, the realism of 
the games — including the depictions and recreations of the 
players — appeals not just to home-team fans, but to bitter 
rivals as well.  Games such as NCAA Football permit users to 
recreate the setting of a bitter defeat and, in effect, achieve 
some cathartic readjustment of history; realistic depictions of 
the players are a necessary element to this.
44
  That 
                                                                                                     
violence of certain modern video games — could still pass 
the Transformative Use Test on other grounds. 
44
 We set aside the “Dynasty” and “Campus Legends” game 
modes in this inquiry.  We see no legally significant 
difference between these modes and the ability in Band Hero 
to select alternative avatars to represent the players or to 
allow members of No Doubt to play with other bands or sing 
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Appellant‟s likeness is the default position only serves to 
support our conclusion that realistic depictions of the players 
are the “sum and substance” of these digital facsimiles.45  See 
Kirby, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 617-18.  Given that Appellant‟s 
unaltered likeness is central to the core of the game 
experience, we are disinclined to credit users‟ ability to alter 
the digital avatars in our application of the Transformative 
Use Test to this case. 
 We are likewise unconvinced that NCAA Football 
satisfies the Transformative Use Test because Appellee 
created various in-game assets to support the altered avatars 
(e.g., additional hair styles, faces, accessories, et al.).  In the 
first instance, the relationship between these assets and the 
digital avatar is predicated on the users‟ desire to alter the 
avatar‟s appearance, which, as we have already noted, is 
insufficient to satisfy the Test.  The ability to make minor 
alterations — which substantially maintain the avatar‟s 
resemblance to Appellant (e.g., modifying only the basic 
biographical information, playing statistics, or uniform 
accessories) — is likewise insufficient, for “[a]n artist 
depicting a celebrity must contribute something more than a 
„merely trivial‟ variation.”  Winter, 69 P.3d at 478-79.  
Indeed, the ability to modify the avatar counts for little where 
                                                                                                     
other musicians‟ songs.  See No Doubt, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 
401. 
45
 Admittedly, just as the presence of a photorealistic 
depiction of a celebrity cannot be the end of the inquiry, the 
mere fact that Appellant‟s likeness is the default appearance 
of the avatar cannot, without more, end our analysis.  It is 
merely another factor to consider in the balancing exercise. 
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the appeal of the game lies in users‟ ability to play “as, or 
alongside” their preferred players or team.  See No Doubt, 
122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 411.  Thus, even avatars with superficial 
modifications to their appearance can count as a suitable 
proxy or market “substitute” for the original.  See Comedy III, 
21 P.3d at 808; Winter, 69 P.3d at 479; Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 
974.  For larger potential changes, such as a different body 
type, skin tone, or face, Appellant‟s likeness is not 
transformed; it simply ceases to be.  Therefore, once a user 
has made major changes to the avatar, it no longer represents 
Appellant, and thus it no longer qualifies as a “use” of the 
Appellant‟s identity for purposes of our inquiry.  Such 
possibilities therefore fall beyond our inquiry into how 
Appellant’s likeness is used in NCAA Football.  That the 
game may lend itself to uses wholly divorced from the 
appropriation of Appellant‟s identity is insufficient to satisfy 
the Transformative Use Test.  See No Doubt, 122 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 397 (focusing on the use of the No Doubt avatars, not 
alternative avatars or custom-made characters). 
 In an attempt to salvage its argument, Appellee 
suggests that other creative elements of NCAA Football, 
which do not affect Appellant‟s digital avatar, are so 
numerous that the videogames should be considered 
transformative.  We believe this to be an improper inquiry.  
Decisions applying the Transformative Use Test invariably 
look to how the celebrity’s identity is used in or is altered by 
other aspects of a work.  Wholly unrelated elements do not 
bear on this inquiry.  Even Comedy III, in listing potentially 
“transformative or creative contributions” focused on 
elements or techniques that affect the celebrity identity.  See 
Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 809 (discussing factual reporting, 
fictionalized portrayal, heavy-handed lampooning, and subtle 
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social criticism); see also Winter, 69 P.3d at 478-79 (noting 
that “[a]n artist depicting a celebrity must contribute 
something more than a „merely trivial‟ variation” before 
proceeding to discuss how the Winter brothers‟ likenesses 
were altered directly and through context); Kirby, 50 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d at 616-18.  To the extent that any of these cases 
considered the broader context of the work (e.g., whether 
events took place in a “fanciful setting”), this inquiry was 
aimed at determining whether this context acted upon the 
celebrity identity in a way that transformed it or imbued it 
with some added creativity beyond providing a “merely 
trivial variation.”46  Thus, while we recognize the creative 
energies necessary for crafting the various elements of NCAA 
Football that are not tied directly to reality, we hold that they 
have no legal significance in our instant decision. 
 To hold otherwise could have deleterious 
consequences for the state of the law.  Acts of blatant 
misappropriation would count for nothing so long as the 
larger work, on balance, contained highly creative elements in 
great abundance.  This concern is particularly acute in the 
case of media that lend themselves to easy partition such as 
video games.  It cannot be that content creators escape 
liability for a work that uses a celebrity‟s unaltered identity in 
one section but that contains a wholly fanciful creation in the 
other, larger section.   
                                              
46
 As we have already discussed, the broader context of 
NCAA Football does not transform Appellant‟s likeness into 
anything other than a digital representation of Appellant 
playing the sport for which he is known, while surrounded by 
the trappings of real-world competition. 
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 For these reasons, we hold that the broad application 
of the Transformative Use Test represents an inappropriate 
application of the standard.  Consequently, we shall not credit 
elements of NCAA Football that do not, in some way, affect 
the use or meaning of Appellant‟s identity. 
 As a final point, we note that the photograph of 
Appellant that appears in NCAA Football 2009 does not bear 
on our analysis above.  On that subject, we agree with the 
District Court that the photograph is “but a fleeting 
component part of the montage” and therefore does not render 
the entire work nontransformative.  Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 
786.  The reasoning from ETW is sufficiently applicable: the 
context of Appellant‟s photograph — the montage — imbues 
the image with additional meaning beyond simply being a 
representation of the player.  See ETW, 332 F.3d at 938 
(holding that the photographs in a collage were “combined to 
describe, in artistic form, a historic event in sports history and 
to convey a message about the significance of [Tiger] 
Woods‟s achievement in that event”).  Consequently, this 
particular use of Appellant‟s likeness is shielded by the First 
Amendment and therefore can contribute nothing to 
Appellant‟s claim for violation of his right of publicity. 
IV.     Conclusion 
 We therefore hold that the NCAA Football 2004, 2005 
and 2006 games at issue in this case do not sufficiently 
transform Appellant‟s identity to escape the right of publicity 
claim and hold that the District Court erred in granted 
summary judgment in favor of Appellee.
47
  While we do hold 
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 There can be no doubt that video games such as NCAA 
Football are the product of great effort, skill, and creative and 
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that the only apparent use of Appellant‟s likeness in NCAA 
Football 2009 (the photograph) is protected by the First 
Amendment, Appellant‟s overall claim for violation of his 
right of publicity should have survived Appellee‟s motion for 
summary judgment.  Consequently, we need not address 
Appellant‟s desire for additional discovery.  We shall reverse 
the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment and remand 
this case back to the court below for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
                                                                                                     
technical prowess.  As the Supreme Court noted in Brown, 
video games convey messages and expressive content in a 
way that is similar to prior media for expression.  Brown v. 
Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011).  At the 
same time, games open new avenues through which artists 
and speakers can express their opinions and observations — 
by playing the game, a user is integrated into the expressive 
work in a way that has never before been achieved.  Surely, 
then, the First Amendment protects video games in the first 
instance, and nothing in our decision today should be read to 
diminish this fact.  Rather, our inquiry looked to whether 
other interests may surmount the First Amendment protection 
— as they can surmount protections for other modes of 
expression.  In finding that NCAA Football failed to satisfy 
the Transformative Use Test, we do not hold that the game 
loses First Amendment protection.  We merely hold that the 
interest protected by the right of publicity in this case 
outweighs the Constitutional shield. 
1 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge, dissenting  
 
My colleagues and I take the same road but read the 
signs differently.  Hence we stop at different places.  I wish I 
was with them; I am not.  I recognize that Electronic Arts, 
Inc. (―EA‖) has taken for the 2005 version of NCAA Football 
what most good Rutgers fans during Ryan Hart‘s playing 
days know—the Rutgers quarterback is Hart—and parlayed 
that recognition into commercial success.
1
  A key to the 
profitability of NCAA Football is consumers‘ desire to 
experience a realistic football playing experience with their 
favorite teams.  EA‘s use of actual college athletes‘ likenesses 
motivates buyers to purchase a new edition each year to keep 
up with their teams‘ changing rosters.  The burn to Hart and 
other amateur athletes is that, unlike their active professional 
counterparts, they are not compensated for EA‘s use of their 
likenesses in its video games.  Were this case viewed strictly 
on the public‘s perception of fairness, I have no doubt Hart‘s 
position would prevail.
2
 
                                                 
1
 That said, most outside Rutgers do not know that 
quarterback #13 is Ryan Hart.  They did not know that in 
2005, and even today many, if not most, Rutgers fans no 
longer connect #13 with Hart.  Fame fades so quickly we call 
it fleeting.  Even nostalgic memories nod off.  For example, 
name the BYU quarterback when it was college football‘s 
national champion in 1984.  (Hint: it wasn‘t Ty Detmer.) 
 
2
 See generally Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, 
The Atlantic, Oct. 2011, at 80–110 (lambasting NCAA 
―amateurism‖ and ―student-athlete‖ policies as ―legalistic 
confections propagated by the universities so they can exploit 
the skills and fame of young athletes,‖ and discussing 
2 
Hart claims that he has under New Jersey law a right 
of publicity to prevent others from unfairly appropriating the 
value of his likeness for their commercial benefit, and that the 
First Amendment does not shield EA‘s infringement of this 
right.  This claim requires us to balance the competing 
interests implicated by the right of publicity and the First 
Amendment.  I agree with my colleagues that the 
Transformative Use Test is the preferred approach for 
balancing these interests, but we part ways on its 
interpretation and application.  The result is that they side 
with Hart, and I with EA. 
The Transformative Use Test gives First Amendment 
immunity where, in an expressive work, an individual‘s 
likeness has been creatively adapted in some way.  Correctly 
applied, this test strikes an appropriate balance between 
countervailing rights—the publicity interest in protecting an 
individual‘s right to benefit financially when others use his 
identifiable persona for their own commercial benefit versus 
the First Amendment interest in insulating from liability a 
creator‘s decision to interweave real-life figures into its 
expressive work. 
My colleagues limit effectively their transformative 
inquiry to Hart‘s identity alone, disregarding other features of 
the work.  This approach, I believe, does not find support in 
the cases on which they rely.  Further, my colleagues penalize 
EA for the realism and financial success of NCAA Football, a 
                                                                                                             
lawsuits challenging these policies); see also Alexander 
Wolff, When Worlds Collide, Sports Illustrated, Feb. 11, 
2013, at 18; Joe Nocera, Pay Up Now, N.Y. Times Mag., Jan. 
1, 2012, at 30–35 (advocating payment of college athletes to 
alleviate ―[t]he hypocrisy that permeates big-money college 
sports‖ arising from amateurism rules). 
3 
position I find difficult to reconcile with First Amendment 
protections traditionally afforded to true-to-life depictions of 
real figures and works produced for profit.  Because I 
conclude that the Transformative Use Test protects EA‘s use 
of Hart‘s likeness in NCAA Football, I respectfully dissent. 
I.  Formulation of the Transformative Inquiry 
To determine whether an individual‘s identity has been 
―transformed‖ for purposes of the Transformative Use Test, I 
believe it is necessary to review the likeness in the context of 
the work in its entirety, rather than focusing only on the 
individual‘s likeness.  This interpretation is in line with the 
approach taken in Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary 
Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001), in which the Supreme 
Court of California first put in play the Transformative Use 
Test.  Per Comedy III, the right of publicity prevails over 
competing First Amendment interests ―[w]hen artistic 
expression takes the form of a literal depiction or imitation of 
a celebrity for commercial gain.‖  Id. at 808 (citing Zacchini 
v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575–76 
(1977)).  To determine whether a work qualifies as 
―transformative‖ and not simply ―literal,‖ the Comedy III 
Court explained that ―the inquiry is whether the celebrity 
likeness is one of the ‗raw materials‘ from which an original 
work is synthesized, or whether the depiction or imitation of 
the celebrity is the very sum and substance of the work in 
question.‖  Id. at 809 (emphases added). 
Likewise, when applying the Transformative Use Test 
two years later in Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 
2003), the California Supreme Court explained that the 
defendant‘s use was transformative because it could ―readily 
ascertain that [the portrayals] are not just conventional 
depictions of plaintiffs but contain significant expressive 
content other than plaintiffs’ mere likenesses.‖  Id. at 479 
4 
(emphasis added).  The Court also observed that the 
characters were placed in a ―larger story, which is itself quite 
expressive.‖  Id.3  The repeated focus on the use of an 
individual‘s likeness in the context of the work as a whole 
leaves me little doubt that we must examine the creative work 
in the aggregate to determine whether it satisfies the 
Transformative Use Test and merits First Amendment 
protection. 
My colleagues correctly recite the Transformative Use 
Test set out in Comedy III and Winter [Majority Op. at 35–
40], but later disregard that recitation.  When addressing 
Hart‘s claim, their analysis proceeds by analyzing, on a step-
by-step basis, the digital avatar based on Hart, the context in 
which that avatar is set in NCAA Football, and the users‘ 
ability to alter the avatar‘s appearance, concluding at each 
step that Hart‘s likeness is not sufficiently changed to qualify 
as ―transformative.‖  In the last instance, my colleagues reject 
as immaterial the myriad other creative elements of the video 
game on the ground that ―[d]ecisions applying the 
Transformative Use Test invariably look to how the 
celebrity’s identity is used,‖ and that ―[w]holly unrelated 
elements do not bear on this inquiry.‖  [Majority Op. at 59 
(emphasis in original).]  But by cabining their inquest to 
                                                 
3
 While the Winter decision makes several references to the 
physical differences between the plaintiffs and their 
likenesses, these statements were made with respect to the 
Court‘s conclusion that ―the portrayals do not greatly threaten 
plaintiffs‘ right of publicity‖ insofar as they were unlikely to 
decrease their commercial value.  69 P.3d at 479.  Similarly, 
there is no real contention that NCAA Football is harming 
ticket sales of college football games or decreasing Hart‘s 
commercial value; if anything, it seems more likely that both 
have been augmented by the popularity of EA‘s video games. 
5 
Hart‘s likeness alone, their approach is at odds with 
California Supreme Court decisions on the Transformative 
Use Test.
4
 
The infirmity of this approach is highlighted by ETW 
Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003), 
in which the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that an 
artist‘s use of several photographs of Tiger Woods in a 
commemorative collage was ―transformative,‖ and thus 
shielded from Woods‘ right-of-publicity suit.  My colleagues 
do not—and, in my view, cannot—explain how the 
photographic images of Woods were transformed if they limit 
their analysis to ―how the celebrity’s identity is used.‖  
[Majority Op. at 59 (emphasis in original).]  Instead, their 
discussion of ETW recognizes that the Sixth Circuit held that 
the artist‘s use qualified for First Amendment protection 
under the Transformative Use Test because ―the collage 
‗contain[ed] significant transformative elements,‘‖ and the 
combination of images ―‗describe[d], in artistic form, a 
historic event in sports history[—the 1997 Masters golf 
tournament—]and . . . convey[ed] a message about the 
significance of Woods‘ achievement in that event.‘‖  
                                                 
4
 The majority opinion relies heavily on two lower court 
decisions in California considering the right of publicity in 
the video game context, No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, 
Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397 (Ct. App. 2011), and Kirby v. Sega 
of America, Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607 (Ct. App. 2006).  I do 
not consider these cases particularly instructive, as they were 
not decided by the architect of the Transformative Use Test, 
the Supreme Court of California.  Thus, I do not attempt to 
explain or distinguish their holdings except to note that I 
believe No Doubt, which focused on individual depictions 
rather than the work in its entirety, was wrongly decided in 
light of the prior precedent in Comedy III and Winter. 
6 
[Majority Op. at 41 (first alteration in original) (emphasis 
added) (quoting ETW, 332 F.3d at 938; citing Comedy III, 21 
P.3d at 809).]  No doubt the use at issue here—creating 
digital avatars of football teams and placing them in an 
interactive medium designed for user interaction and 
manipulation—is significantly more ―transformative‖ than the 
use in ETW, which simply combined several photographs into 
a photomontage. 
To me, a narrow focus on an individual‘s likeness, 
rather than how that likeness is incorporated into and 
transformed by the work as a whole, is a flawed formulation 
of the transformative inquiry.  The whole—the aggregate of 
many parts (including, here, many individuals)—is the better 
baseline for that inquiry. 
II.  Harmonization of the Transformative Use Test with 
First Amendment Precedent 
Transformative use must mesh with existing 
constitutional protections for works of expression.  The First 
Amendment extends protection to biographies, 
documentaries, docudramas, and other expressive works 
depicting real-life figures, whether the accounts are factual or 
fictional.  See, e.g., Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 
439–40 (5th Cir. 1994) (biographical novel); Ruffin-Steinback 
v. dePasse, 82 F. Supp. 2d 723, 730–31 (E.D. Mich. 2000) 
(television miniseries), aff ’d, 267 F.3d 457, 461–62 (6th Cir. 
2001); Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 949 F. Supp. 331, 337 
(E.D. Pa. 1996); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 
426, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (docudrama and novel); Guglielmi 
v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 458–59 (Cal. 
1979) (docudrama).
5
  ―That books, newspapers, and 
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 While my colleagues acknowledge the need for uniform 
First Amendment treatment of different mediums in the 
7 
magazines are published and sold for profit does not prevent 
them from being a form of expression whose liberty is 
safeguarded by the First Amendment.‖  Joseph Burstyn, Inc. 
v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952).  Accordingly, courts 
have rejected as counter to free expression the claim that 
constitutional protection is diminished because a celebrity‘s 
name or likeness was used to increase a product‘s value and 
marketability.  See Guglielmi, 603 P.2d at 460–62 (Bird, C.J., 
concurring).
6
 
The protection afforded by the First Amendment to 
those who weave celebrities into their creative works and sell 
those works for profit applies equally to video games.  See 
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 
(2011).  Thus EA‘s use of real-life likenesses as ―characters‖ 
in its NCAA Football video game should be as protected as 
portrayals (fictional or nonfictional) of individuals in movies 
and books.  I do not suggest that all digital portrayals of an 
individual are entitled to First Amendment protection.  
Rather, the work should be protected if that likeness, as 
included in the creative composition, has been transformed 
into something more or different than what it was before.  
And in any event the profit that flows from EA‘s realistic 
depiction of Hart (and the myriad other college football 
players portrayed in NCAA Football) is not constitutionally 
                                                                                                             
abstract [Majority Op. at 51], it is difficult to reconcile their 
actual application of the Transformative Use Test to the video 
game here with the above-cited cases. 
 
6
 As recognized by my colleagues, then-Chief Justice Bird‘s 
views in Guglielmi commanded the support of the majority of 
the California Supreme Court, and were relied on by the 
Comedy III Court to guide its definition of the Transformative 
Use Test.  [Majority Op. at 48 n.31.] 
8 
significant, nor even an appropriate consideration, when 
applying the Transformative Use Test.
7
 
My colleagues‘ understanding of the Transformative 
Use Test underplays the creative elements of NCAA Football 
by equating its inclusion of realistic player likenesses to 
increase profits with the wrongful appropriation of Hart‘s 
commercial value.  This approach is at odds with the First 
Amendment protection afforded to expressive works 
incorporating real-life figures.  That protection does not 
depend on whether the characters are depicted realistically or 
whether their inclusion increases profits.  See Guglielmi, 603 
P.2d at 460–62 (Bird, C.J., concurring) (concluding that 
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 In devising the Transformative Use Test, the California 
Supreme Court borrowed from ―the purpose and character of 
the use‖ factor relevant to a copyright fair use defense, see 17 
U.S.C. § 107(1), yet it rejected ―a wholesale importation of 
the fair use doctrine into right of publicity law,‖ Comedy III, 
21 P.3d at 807.  Nonetheless, it appears my colleagues permit 
another fair use factor to creep into their transformative 
analysis.  Namely, their focus on the marketability of NCAA 
Football seems colored by the factor considering ―the effect 
of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work,‖ see 17 U.S.C. § 107(4), notwithstanding 
that this element was expressly excluded from Comedy III‘s 
articulation of the Transformative Use Test, see 21 P.3d at 
808 n.10.  Further, even if consideration of ―market effect‖ 
were appropriate in a transformative analysis, I do not believe 
this factor would weigh in favor of finding an infringing use 
here because, as pointed out supra note 3, there is no 
contention that EA‘s inclusion of Hart‘s likeness in NCAA 
Football has caused a decline in the commercial value of his 
identity or persona. 
9 
acceptance of this argument would chill free expression and 
mean ―the creation of historical novels and other works 
inspired by actual events and people would be off limits to the 
fictional author‖). 
In sum, applying the Transformative Use Test in the 
manner done by my colleagues creates a medium-specific 
metric that provides less protection to video games than other 
expressive works.  Because the Supreme Court‘s decision in 
Brown forecloses just such a distinction, see 131 S. Ct. at 
2740, my colleagues‘ treatment of realism and profitability in 
their transformative use analysis puts us on a different course. 
III.  Application to Hart’s Claim 
With this understanding of the Transformative Use 
Test, I conclude EA‘s use of avatars resembling actual 
players is entitled to First Amendment protection.  NCAA 
Football transforms Hart‘s mere likeness into an avatar that, 
along with the rest of a digitally created college football team, 
users can direct and manipulate in fictional football games.  
With the many other creative features incorporated 
throughout the games, sufficient expressive transformation 
takes place to merit First Amendment protection. 
NCAA Football involves myriad original graphics, 
videos, sound effects, and game scenarios.  These artistic 
aspects permit a user to direct the play of a college football 
team whose players may be based on a current roster, a past 
roster, or an entirely imaginary roster comprised of made-up 
players.  Users are not reenacting real games, but rather are 
directing the avatars in invented games and seasons.  Further, 
the ―Campus Legend‖ and ―Dynasty Mode‖ features permit 
users to control virtual players and teams for multiple 
seasons, creating the means by which they can generate their 
own narratives.  Such modes of interactive play are, I submit, 
10 
imaginative transformations of the games played by real 
players.  
As noted by the District Court, it is not only the user 
that contributes to the interactivity; EA has created ―multiple 
permutations available for each virtual player image.‖  Hart v. 
Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 785 (D.N.J. 2011).  This 
furthers the game‘s transformative interactivity.  In fact, the 
majority opinion expressly approves the District Court‘s 
analysis on this point.  [Majority Op. at 54–55 n.40.] 
By limiting their inquiry to the realistic rendering of 
Hart‘s individual image, my colleagues misapply the 
Transformative Use Test.  Contrary to their assertion that the 
other creative elements of NCAA Football are ―[w]holly 
unrelated‖ [Majority Op. at 59], those elements are, in fact, 
related to its use of Hart‘s likeness.  If and when a user 
decides to select the virtual 2005 Rutgers‘ football team as a 
competitor in a game, and to the extent that user does not alter 
the characteristics of the avatar based on Hart‘s likeness, the 
numerous creative elements of the video games discussed 
above are part of every fictional play a user calls.  Any 
attempt to separate these elements from the use of Hart‘s 
likeness disregards NCAA Football‘s many expressive 
features beyond an avatar having characteristics similar to 
Hart.  His likeness is transformed by the artistry necessary to 
create a digitally rendered avatar within the imaginative and 
interactive world EA has placed that avatar. 
I am thus convinced that, as used in NCAA Football, 
Hart‘s ―likeness is one of the ‗raw materials‘ from which 
[the] original work is synthesized . . . [rather than] the very 
sum and substance of the work in question.‖  Comedy III, 21 
P.3d at 809.  EA bases its NCAA Football characters on 
countless real-life college football players, and it certainly 
seeks to depict their physical and biographical characteristics 
11 
realistically.  Yet these ―are not just conventional depictions 
of [Hart] but contain significant expressive content other than 
[his] mere likeness[].‖  Winter, 69 P.3d at 479.  NCAA 
Football uses creative means to achieve its overall goal of 
realistically replicating a college football experience in which 
users may interact, direct, and control the players‘ avatars, 
including the one based on Hart‘s likeness.  I find this use 
transformative. 
*    *    *    *    * 
The Transformative Use Test I support would prevent 
commercial exploitation of an individual‘s likeness where the 
work at issue lacks creative contribution that transforms that 
likeness in a meaningful way.  I sympathize with the position 
of Hart and other similarly situated college football players, 
and understand why they feel it is fair to share in the 
significant profits produced by including their avatar 
likenesses into EA‘s commercially successful video game 
franchise.  I nonetheless remain convinced that the creative 
components of NCAA Football contain sufficient expressive 
transformation to merit First Amendment protection.  Thus I 
respectfully dissent, and would affirm the District Court‘s 
grant of summary judgment in favor of EA. 
